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Abstract
We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multi-dimensional cheap
talk by an expert to a decision maker. We ﬁnd that an expert with state-independent prefer-
ences can always make credible comparative statements that trade oﬀ the expert’s incentive to
exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication beneﬁts the expert — cheap talk is “persua-
sive” — if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication beneﬁts a decision maker by allowing
for a more informed decision, but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can
reverse this gain. We apply these results to topics including media bias, advertising, product
recommendations, voting, and auction disclosure. JEL: D82, L15, C72, D72.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Experts often have strong biases. Lobbyists are paid to promote projects, stock analysts beneﬁt
from pushing stocks, and salespeople are paid to sell products. When an expert has a strong
bias, can a decision maker still obtain useful information from the expert? If communication is
via costless, unveriﬁable “cheap talk” then communication in a single dimension is possible if and
only if the expert’s incentive to exaggerate is not too large (Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel,
1982). Consequently, most of the literature on communication by very biased experts assumes that
credibility arises from the costliness of messages as in signaling games (e.g., Michael Spence, 1973)
or from the veriﬁability of messages as in persuasion games (e.g., Paul Milgrom, 1981).
We reexamine the potential for cheap talk communication by an expert who is so biased as to
always prefer the same action regardless of the state of the world. For instance, a biased salesperson
wants to sell a product regardless of its true quality. Such state-independent preferences are common
in the signaling and persuasion game literatures, but not in the cheap talk literature because they
do not permit communication when the expert only has information in a single dimension. However,
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1an expert often has information on multiple aspects of a decision-problem, e.g., a salesperson has
information about multiple products or about multiple diﬀerent attributes of a single product, so
we consider environments with multidimensional information.
We ﬁnd that the combination of multidimensional information and state-independent preferences
is suﬃcient to ensure that the expert can credibly communicate through simple cheap talk and
inﬂuence decision-making. The multidimensional nature of information allows the expert to make
comparative statements that balance out her incentives to exaggerate, and the decision maker can
use his knowledge of the expert’s motives to infer the “dimensions” along which the expert has no
incentive to deceive the decision-maker. As long as the expert’s preferences are independent of her
private information, the decision maker can adjust for the expert’s biases and ﬁlter out the credible
content of the expert’s messages even when the expert favors some issues arbitrarily more than
others.
Cheap talk is “persuasive” when it induces the decision maker to act to the beneﬁto ft h e
expert. Since inﬂuential communication makes the decision maker’s updated estimates of the true
state of the world more extreme relative to ex-ante expectations, the expert beneﬁts from such
communication when she prefers extreme estimates on some dimensions to average ones on every
dimension. Therefore the expert beneﬁts overall when her preferences over the decision maker’s
estimates are quasiconvex, i.e., her indiﬀerence curves are “bowed outwards.” Indeed, cheap talk
by an expert with quasiconvex preferences is persuasive not just in expectation but in all states
of the world. Such preferences arise naturally in many environments where the literature has not
recognized a role for cheap talk and we examine several in detail.
First, in a model of product recommendations, we show that a seller can credibly talk up a
product by implicitly talking down another product. Such cheap talk helps the buyer make a better
decision and, under the assumptions of standard discrete choice models, increases the probability of
a sale. Second, in a voting model applied to jury decisions, we show how a defense attorney beneﬁts
from acknowledging the defendant’s bad behavior in one dimension in the hope of persuading some
jurors that he does not warrant conviction based on his better behavior in another dimension. Such
cheap talk uniformly lowers the probability of conviction under the unanimity rule. Third, in an
auction model, we show that a seller can credibly indicate to buyers the relative strengths of a
product, thereby inducing a better match of the product with the buyer who values it most, but
also weakening competition among buyers. Seller revenues rise as a result of the gain in allocational
eﬃciency if and only if there are enough buyers to ensure suﬃcient competition. Fourth, in a
monopoly model we show that a ﬁrm beneﬁts from cheap talk advertising that emphasizes either
the high quality of its product in a vertical dimension or the broadness of its appeal in a horizontal
dimension.
In all of these situations the expert does not need to commit to a policy of revealing information.
Instead the expert beneﬁts from simple cheap talk that is credible and inﬂuential because of the
state-independence of preferences and the multidimensional nature of communication, and that is
persuasive because of the quasiconvexity of preferences. The information revealed is favorable on
some dimensions and unfavorable on others but overall the expert faces no temptation to deviate
from the communication strategy. This distinguishes our cheap talk approach from other models
of communication that emphasize one-dimensional uncertainty and assume that the expert reveals
2even unfavorable information.1
Communication beneﬁts a decision maker by allowing for more informed decision-making. How-
ever, if multiple decision makers play a game after hearing the expert’s message, strategic interactions
between them can sometimes oﬀset the gains from better information.2 In the auction and adver-
tising models we ﬁnd that cheap talk always beneﬁts the buyers by allowing for more informed
purchasing decisions, but in the voting model we ﬁnd that cheap talk which beneﬁts the speaker can
hurt the voters. Each voter individually beneﬁts from the ability to make a more informed decision,
but this gain can be negated by the decisions of other voters with diﬀerent preferences who also
react to the information.
How much information can be revealed by cheap talk? Even if the expert has a strong incentive
to exaggerate within each of N dimensions, there is always an N − 1 dimensional subspace over
which the expert has no incentive to deceive the decision maker. Therefore, full revelation on these
N −1 “dimensions of agreement” may be possible.3 With linear preferences we show that this limit
is always attainable even with arbitrary distributions and arbitrary biases across dimensions through
a series of increasingly detailed statements. For preferences that are strictly quasiconvex, detailed
cheap talk using mixed strategies is also possible, with the expert’s payoﬀ strictly higher the more
detailed is her speech.
These results rely on the assumption of state-independence, but some state-dependence will
often be present in practice. In an online appendix containing extensions of the model, we show how
communication is robust to small deviations from state-independence in three ways. First, if there
are only a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent types of expert preferences, then an inﬂuential equilibrium exists
as long as the expert has information on a larger number of dimensions of interest to the decision
maker(s). Second, if the probability that the expert’s preferences are diﬀerent from the expected
type is suﬃciently low, then under mild regularity conditions an equilibrium exists in which the
decision maker still obtains information from the expected type while low probability types always
recommend the same action. Finally, if preferences that are state-dependent converge uniformly
to state-independent preferences, as is the case with Euclidean preferences converging to linear
preferences, then any incentive to deviate from the cheap talk equilibria of the limiting preferences
goes to zero.
We analyze how multiple dimensions of information can make cheap talk credible in environments
where the literature has typically relied on the costliness or veriﬁability of messages to explain the
credibility of communication. We do not consider other factors that can also generate credibility, such
as reputational concerns (Joel Sobel, 1985; Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque, 1992; Stephen Morris,
2001; Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro, 2006; Marco Ottaviani and Peter Sørenson, 2006), or
competition between multiple experts (Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, 1989; David Austen-
Smith, 1993; Vijay Krishna and John Morgan, 2001; Marco Battaglini, 2002; Sendhil Mullainathan
1For instance, commitment to revealing unfavorable information is the assumption in most of the literature on
seller communication in auctions following Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber (1982), and in most of the literature
on information sharing between ﬁrms as surveyed by Xavier Vives (2001). Such revelation can also occur due to
“unravelling” in a persuasion game with veriﬁable information (e.g., Milgrom, 2001).
2Following the analysis of Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons (1989), the literature on cheap talk with multiple
audiences has focused on one-dimensional information.
3Marco Battaglini (2002) develops the idea of a dimension of agreement in the context of state-dependent pref-
erences. See also David Spector’s (2000) model with divergent priors in which debate reduces conﬂict to a single
dimension.
3and Vijay Shleifer, 2005; Attila Ambrus and Satoru Takahashi, 2008; Wolfgang Gick, 2006; Bauke
Visser and Otto Swank, 2007).
In Section 2 we set up the model, demonstrate the existence of inﬂuential equilibria, identify
conditions under which communication beneﬁts the expert, and show when cheap talk can reveal
ﬁne information. Section 3 provides examples that illustrate the results, and Section 4 discusses the
relationship of the results to the literature and concludes. All proofs are in the attached Appendix
and an online Appendix contains robustness extensions of the model.
2 The Model
An expert privately knows the realization of a multidimensional state θ ∈ Θ where Θ is a compact
convex subset of RN with a non-empty interior and N ≥ 2. She sends advice in the form of a costless4
unveriﬁable message m from an arbitrary set M to an uninformed decision maker (or decision makers)
whose prior beliefs about θ are summarized by a joint distribution F with density f that has full
support on Θ. A communication strategy for the expert speciﬁes a probability distribution over
messages in M as a function of the state θ. The decision maker estimates the expected value of
θ given his priors, the expert’s strategy, and the expert’s message m. We represent these updated
estimates or “actions” of the decision maker by a = E[θ|m]. This standard behavioral assumption
can be generated in diﬀerent ways from the underlying preferences of the decision maker(s) as seen
in Section 3.
The expert’s preferences over the estimates a are described by a continuous utility function U(a)
that does not depend on the state θ and is common knowledge, i.e., are state-independent.5 Given
the speciﬁcation of decision maker behavior, a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of this cheap talk game
is fully speciﬁed by the expert’s communication strategy.6 A communication strategy is a cheap talk
equilibrium if the expert has no incentive to deviate by “misreporting” information about θ.W e
say that an equilibrium is inﬂuential if diﬀerent messages induce diﬀerent estimates a with strictly
positive probability.
As an initial example, consider a news network which has private information on the seriousness
of two political scandals as represented by the random variables θ1 and θ2. Given a message m from
the network, the network audience estimates the seriousness of the scandals as a1 = E[θ1|m] and
a2 = E[θ2|m]. The network’s utility function is U = ρ1a1+ρ2a2 where the network has a ratings bias
to exaggerate the seriousness of either scandal, ρi > 0, and a possible partisan bias to exaggerate
one scandal more, ρ1 6= ρ2. Figure 1(a) shows the network’s indiﬀerence curves for ρ1 =4 , ρ2 =1
and state space Θ =[ 0 ,1]2.
Suppose this space is partitioned into regions R+ and R− by a line h and the network’s message
m+ or m− indicates which region θ falls in. As h is spun around any interior point, c =( 1 /2,1/2)
in this example, the estimates a+ =( E[θ1|m+],E[θ2|m+]) and a− =( E[θ1|m−],E[θ2|m−]) change
continuously and eventually reverse themselves as seen by their “circular” path.7 Therefore for some
4In practice the expert might have to pay to send a message (e.g., an advertising fee), or might receive a payment
for sending a message (e.g., a subscription fee). This has no eﬀect on equilibrium behavior as long as the amount paid
or received does not vary with the message.
5As discussed in Section 4, this state-independence assumption is where we depart from the Crawford-Sobel model.
6We assume that all messages in M are used in equilibrium, and accordingly avoid specifying oﬀ-equilibrium-path
beliefs. This is without loss of generality in a cheap talk game.
7For the pictured case of θi i.i.d. uniform, as h is rotated from the 45 degree line, the estimates shift from
4Figure 1: Equilibrium Construction
h the estimates a+ and a− must fall on the same indiﬀerence curve, implying that the incentive to
lie about which region θ falls in is eliminated. In equilibrium if the network “plays up” the ﬁrst
scandal (message m−) the estimate of its seriousness goes up only slightly, while if the network plays
up the second scandal (message m+) the estimate of its seriousness rises substantially.
The following Theorem shows that this argument does not depend on the speciﬁcc h o i c eo f
preferences and priors nor on the number of dimensions N ≥ 2. Fixing any point c in the interior of
Θ,ah y p e r p l a n eh through c is identiﬁed by its orientation s, a point on the unit sphere SN−1 ⊂ RN,
that provides the gradient of h.S i n c e t h e d i ﬀerence U(a+) − U(a−) is a continuous odd map as
af u n c t i o no fs,t h ed i ﬀerence must be zero for some orientation s∗ (and associated hyperplane).8
Therefore the expert gains nothing from misrepresenting which region the state θ is in, i.e., the
communication strategy represented by the partition is an equilibrium. Since the regions R+ and
R− are convex the estimates are contained in each region and therefore distinct, a+ 6= a−, and since
c is in the interior and f has full support, each estimate is induced with strictly positive probability.
Therefore the equilibrium is inﬂuential.
Theorem 1 An inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium exists for all U and F.
Cheap talk is credible because of an endogenous tradeoﬀ whereby the expert gains in some
dimensions but loses in others. This tradeoﬀ allows for credible communication even when the
expert wants a higher estimate in one dimension and a lower estimate in another dimension. Figure
1(b) shows such a case where U =4 a1 − a2, e.g., a political campaign wants to raise the perceived
quality of its candidate and to lower that of the competing candidate. In equilibrium, the credibility
of a positive message about its own candidate is sustained by an endogenous cost in the form of an
improved public perception of the competing candidate. Similarly if the campaign says something
negative about the competing candidate perceptions of both candidates must fall.9 The ﬁgure shows
a+ =( E[θ1|θ1 <θ 2],E[θ2|θ1 <θ 2]) = (1/3,2/3) and a− =( E[θ1|θ1 ≥ θ2],E[θ2|θ1 ≥ θ2]) = (2/3,1/3),i nw h i c hc a s e
U(a−) >U(a+),t oa+ =( 2 /3,1/3) and a− =( 1 /3,2/3),i nw h i c hc a s eU(a−) <U(a+), and back again.
8This is a direct application of the Borsuk-Ulam theorem: every continuous odd map g from SN−1 to RN−1 must
have the origin in its image, i.e., g(s∗)=0for some s∗ ∈ SN−1 (see, e.g., Jiri Matousek, 2003). A map g is odd if
g(−s)=−g(s) for all s.
9This pattern is observed in political advertising (Richard Lau et al., 1999) and product advertising (Shailendra
5this tradeoﬀ for hyperplane h with estimates a+ and a− on the same rising indiﬀerence curve. The
additional hyperplanes and estimates illustrate the multi-message equilibria in Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 1 establishes existence for any interior c so its position can be chosen to increase the
value of cheap talk to the decision maker or the expert. For the decision maker, the value of cheap
talk is limited if the space is partitioned such that almost all the probability mass corresponds to
one of the messages, but this is avoided if c is the centerpoint of Θ, in which case by the centerpoint
theorem for any h through c the probability mass of each half-space is at least 1/(N +1 ) .10 For the
expert, Section 3 provides examples in which the choice of c ensures that the expert beneﬁts strictly
from cheap talk.
Any inﬂuential communication strategy induces a mean-preserving spread in the decision maker’s
updated estimates, implying that the expert beneﬁts relative to remaining silent or “babbling” if
her preferences are convex.11 In any cheap talk equilibrium the weaker condition of quasiconvexity
is suﬃcient. Since the lower contour sets of a quasiconvex U are convex, and since the prior estimate
E[θ] is a convex combination of the posterior estimates E[θ|m] that lie on the same indiﬀerence
curve in equilibrium, the prior estimate must lie on a lower indiﬀerence curve. In such cases we say
that cheap talk is “persuasive.”12
Theorem 2 Relative to no communication, any inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium (strictly) beneﬁts
the expert if U is (strictly) quasiconvex and (strictly) hurts the expert if U is (strictly) quasiconcave.
Quasiconvexity implies that all the equilibrium estimates E[θ|m] oﬀer higher utility than E[θ].
So the expert beneﬁts from communication not just in expected terms before learning her informa-
tion, but beneﬁts equally for every realization of her private information. As shown in Section 3,
quasiconvexity emerges in many standard economic environments from the structure of the deci-
sion problem or from interactions between multiple decision makers, creating a role for persuasive
pre-play cheap talk.
Regarding the payoﬀs to the decision maker(s), the partitional equilibria we consider always
beneﬁt a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision (Blackwell, 1953), but if there are
multiple decision makers that play a game after hearing the expert their interactions can oﬀset this
gain. The examples in Section 3 provide two cases where each of multiple decision makers beneﬁts,
and one case where the decision makers are all worse oﬀ from more information.
To investigate how an expert can reveal more information than in the equilibria of Theorem 1, we
now consider “k-message equilibria” which induce the decision maker to make k distinct estimates.
Consider again Figure 1(b) and suppose we follow the same procedure for the upper region to spin
an e wh y p e r p l a n eh+ around a+, and also follow the same procedure for the lower region to spin a





Jain and Steven Posovac, 2004). Mattias Polborn and David Yi (2006) model the phenomenon in a disclosure game.
10See, e.g., Matousek (2003). The centerpoint is a multidimensional generalization of the median and need not be
unique. Note that the choice of h can also aﬀect informativeness. For N>2 the Borsuk-Ulam theorem implies that for
any c in the interior of Θ there is at least one h where both the diﬀerences U(a+)−U(a−) and Pr[θ ∈ R+]−Pr[θ ∈ R−]
are equal to zero, implying each equilibrium estimate is induced with ex ante probability 1/2.
11A babbling equilibrium in which messages convey no information exists in any standard cheap talk game.
12The proof of Theorem 2 uses the even weaker condition that the lower contour set for the indiﬀerence curve
through E[θ] is convex, rather than all lower contour sets being convex as implied by quasiconvexity. Also, by relying
on the law of iterated expectations, the proof uses the fact that the a’s are expectations, in contrast to Theorem 1
which only uses the continuity of the estimates a in the orientation s. Nothing substantive changes if the ai’s are
instead expectations of monotone transforms of the θi’s.




−. Since the estimates are all on the same linear indiﬀerence curve
through E[θ], the expert has no incentive to lie and the partition is a four-message equilibrium.
To extend this procedure to more messages and more dimensions, consider linear preferences of the
form
U(a)=ρ · a (1)
where the ρ =( ρ1,...,ρ N) is a vector of real numbers that captures the expert’s bias or “slant”
across dimensions. For the following result we show that it is possible to repeatedly apply Theorem
1 as described above to obtain an arbitrarily ﬁne partition in N − 1 dimensions.
Theorem 3 An inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium revealing almost all information on N −1 dimen-
s i o n se x i s t si fU is linear.
To see the result for two dimensions, consider a 2k-message equilibrium where each region is
repeatedly subdivided by a hyperplane through thec e n t e r p o i n to ft h er e g i o na si nF i g u r e1 ( b ) .B y
the centerpoint theorem each element has probability mass at most (1 − 1/(N +1 ) )
k which goes to
zero as k increases. The full support assumption implies that there must lie an equilibrium estimate
within any ε>0 of any point on the equilibrium indiﬀerence line for k large enough. In this sense,
the expert reveals almost all information in one dimension of the two-dimensional space as k becomes
large. To extend this to three or more dimensions, we utilize the extra degrees of freedom given
by the fact that N>2 and “slice and dice” the successive partition elements in order to obtain
equilibrium estimates that for large k form an arbitrarily ﬁne grid of the expert’s N −1 dimensional
equilibrium indiﬀerence hyperplane.
Theorem 3 returns to an idea due to Marco Battaglini (2002) that in two dimensions it can
be possible to reveal full information in a one-dimensional subspace (the dimension of agreement)
on which there is no conﬂict of interest. As Battaglini noted, for state-dependent preferences such
revelation can only occur in special cases with special distributions.13 We ﬁnd that such revelation
is possible generally for linear preferences. Moreover, as shown in the online Appendix, linear
preferences are of particular interest since they are the limiting case of standard Euclidean preferences
as biases become large.
Now consider the potential for multiple messages when preferences are not linear. When we divide
the initial two regions further as in Figure 1(b), we run into the problem that application of Theorem








−), but without linearity there is no
assurance that all four estimates are on the same indiﬀerence curve. The following Theorem shows
that, when preferences are quasiconcave or quasiconvex, mixed messages can be used to equalize
the payoﬀs and ensure that a cheap talk equilibrium with an arbitrarily large number of inﬂuential
messages exists.
Theorem 4 A 2k-message inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium exists for every k ≥ 1 if U is strictly
quasiconvex, with the expert’s payoﬀ strictly increasing in k.
The proof uses an inductive argument that creates a 2k-message equilibrium from a 2k−1-message
equilibrium. We illustrate the logic here by creating a four-message equilibrium from a two-message
one. Starting from a two-message equilibrium with induced estimates a+, a− we ﬁnd a hyperplane
13Battaglini discusses the diﬃculty of such revelation as a step toward understanding why multiple experts are
needed to obtain full revelation in all dimensions.

















−), we have a four-message equilibrium.








−). Due to the strict quasiconvexity of U,w e









− when θ ∈ R+, the informativeness of each message falls and the expectations for the messages
become closer, eventually both equalling a+.B yc o n t i n u i t y ,t h e r em u s tb es o m em i xs u c ht h a tt h e




−), implying a four-message equilibrium
exists in which two of the messages are mixed over.
This procedure can be extended to generate equilibria with 2k messages for any k and all N ≥ 2.
By strict quasiconvexity, the expert’s payoﬀ is strictly increasing in k. Since all the induced estimates
lie on the same indiﬀerence curve, this mixed message equilibrium is also a sequential cheap talk
equilibrium in that the expert can make successive statements corresponding to the successive stages
of the procedure. In this sense the “longer” that cheap talk continues, the more information that is
revealed.14
3 Applications
We now analyze several applications where the richness of the expert’s information ensures the
credibility of cheap talk, and the quasiconvexity of the expert’s preferences implies that the expert
beneﬁts from such communication. The ﬁrst application considers the simplest case of a single
decision maker and the subsequent applications consider multiple decision makers who may play a
game after hearing the expert’s message.
3.1 Persuasive Recommendations
Consider a decision maker who faces a choice between multiple alternatives and consults an expert
who has a strong bias against one choice. For instance, a salesperson advises a customer who might
buy one of multiple products, but might also walk away and leave the salesperson without a sale.
Or an industry lobbyist advises a senator who might support one of several proposals to help the
industry, but might also decline to support any. Can cheap talk be credible and beneﬁtt h ee x p e r t
by lowering the probability of the undesired choice?
To analyze this question, suppose a buyer might purchase one of N diﬀerent products or nothing
at all from a seller who seeks to maximize the probability of a sale.15 The utility of purchasing
product i is vi, which is a strictly increasing linear function of a quality variable θi known only by
the seller.16 The utility from not buying is ε, a random variable with prior G that is independent
of θ and known only by the buyer. Given estimated quality ai = E[θi|m] the probability that the
14Vijay Krishna and John Morgan (2004) and Robert Aumann and Sergio Hart (2003) consider mixed strategies
in multi-stage cheap talk games. Whereas the multi-stage aspect of communication is central to their results, in our
game the communication may also be one-stage.
15In this application we focus on the asymmetry between the choices that the expert prefers and the one that she
does not. Using the multinomial logit model introduced below, the analysis can be extended to allow the expert to
favor some of the preferred choices more than others. Quasiconvexity holds as long as the payoﬀs from the preferred
choices are suﬃciently similar relative to that from the unpreferred choice.
16Utility vi is net of a ﬁxed price pi. In Application C below the price is endogenously determined by bidders in an
auction while in Application D it is set in competition between sellers.




Since U is continuous, inﬂuential cheap talk is possible by Theorem 1, and since U is a monotonic
function of the convex max{·} function and therefore quasiconvex, the seller beneﬁts from such cheap
talk by Theorem 2.17 The buyer also beneﬁts from the extra information since he can make a more
informed choice. The next result follows immediately.
Proposition 1 Seller recommendations are credible, beneﬁt the seller by increasing the probability
of a sale, and beneﬁt the buyer by providing more information.
Figure 2(a) shows the case of N =2where vi = ai and the θi and ε are i.i.d. uniform on [0,1].
Without communication the expected quality of either good is E[θi]=1 /2 so the probability of a sale
is G(1/2) = 1/2, while with cheap talk that indicates which product is better the expected quality
of the better good is E[maxi{θi}]=2 /3 so the probability of a sale is G(2/3) = 2/3. Therefore both
the buyer and seller are better oﬀ.A ss e e ni nt h eﬁgure from the indiﬀerence curves representing
iso-probability contours of U, the lower contour sets are convex, so U is quasiconvex and a+ and a−
are on a higher indiﬀerence curve than c = E[θ].
Following a standard discrete choice model, the analysis can be extended to accommodate more
uncertainty over the buyer’s choices. In particular, suppose that the buyer’s utility from each
product is vi + εi where εi is known only by the buyer and independent of θ. Under the standard
multinomial logit model in which εi and ε follow independent Type 1 extreme value distributions,
Daniel McFadden (1973) shows that the probability of good i being purchased is evi(ai)/(1+Σievi(ai)),
implying that U(a)=1−1/(1+Σievi(ai)).N o t et h a tU is a monotonic function of Σievi(ai),t h es u m
of strictly convex monotone transformations of linear functions. Therefore, although U is not convex,
it is strictly quasiconvex, implying by Theorem 2 that the seller always beneﬁts from inﬂuential cheap
talk.18
3.2 Inﬂuencing Voters
Now consider a discrete choice problem involving multiple decision makers voting on a collective
decision after listening to an expert. In particular, consider a jury trial with heterogeneous jurors
inﬂuenced by diﬀerent aspects of a case, e.g., whether or not the defendant is technically guilty,
and whether or not the defendant deserves punishment. Let θi capture the strength of the case on
aspect i which is the defense attorney’s private information. Jurors in group i =1 ,2 have payoﬀ
θi −τi from conviction and payoﬀ 0 from acquittal. The threshold τi privately known by the jurors
is distributed on [0,1] independently of θ and τ−i according to Gi with continuous density gi.T h e
probability that jurors in group i vote for conviction given estimate ai is then Gi(ai) so, if conviction
requires a unanimous vote, the probability of conviction is the intersection G1(a1)G2(a2) and the
probability of acquittal is
U(a)=1− G1(a1)G2(a2). (3)
17Even though U is not strictly quasiconvex, the seller can reach a strictly higher indiﬀerence curve via cheap talk
if maxi{vi(θi)} varies in θ and c is chosen to be at the kink of the indiﬀerence curve through E[θ].T h ec h o i c eo fc in
ensuring a strict gain to the expert is discussed further in Application C.
18More generally, if G is the joint distribution of ε1 − ε,...,εN − ε, then the probability of no sale is G(−v(a)) so
U(a)=1− G(−v(a)) is quasiconvex if G(−v(a)) is quasiconcave.
9Figure 2: Applications
Since U is continuous, Theorem 1 implies that a defense attorney maximizing U can engage in
credible and inﬂuential cheap talk, e.g., emphasize that the defendant is of strong moral character
(even if he might be guilty), or emphasize that the client is innocent (even if he might be a scoundrel).
As shown in the proof of the following Proposition, if Gi is log-concave then U is a strictly quasiconvex
function in the interior of [0,1]2, so by Theorem 2 the defense beneﬁts from communication regardless
of the merits of the case θ.19 More information beneﬁts each individual juror in isolation, but under
the unanimity rule the jurors favoring conviction are hurt if communication induces other jurors to
switch to favoring acquittal. As a result jurors can lose overall in expected terms and always do so
if, for instance, Gi is uniform.
Proposition 2 Under the unanimity rule cheap talk by the defense strictly lowers the probability of
conviction if each Gi is log-concave. Jurors can each be worse oﬀ in expectation from such cheap
talk.
The unanimity rule encourages the defense to provide information in the hope that at least
one type of voter will be persuaded to vote for acquittal. By the same token if the prosecution
knew θ it would be worse oﬀ from any communication via cheap talk. Figure 2(b) shows a two-
message equilibrium for i.i.d. uniform θi and i.i.d. uniform τi with the defense’s quasiconvex
19Since the probability of conviction is strictly quasiconcave for any N for logconcave Gi, the result extends to
N>2 diﬀerent voters interested in diﬀerent aspects of the case. Interdependence between the τi,w h i c hc a nc a p t u r e
diﬀerent weights on diﬀerent issues and diﬀerently sized groups of voters with similar preferences, can be allowed for
by considering the quasiconcavity of the joint distribution G evaluated at a.
10preferences U =1− a1a2 where utility is decreasing away from the origin as the probability of
conviction increases. Since τi is uniform, given estimates a, each juror’s expected payoﬀ conditional
on conviction, ai − E[τi|τi <a i],i sl i n e a ri nai. Therefore, on average across messages, each juror
earns the same expected payoﬀ conditional on conviction in any equilibrium. More information
then hurts each juror by lowering the probability with which conviction occurs. By Theorem 4
this two-message equilibrium can be extended to an arbitrarily “long” informative speech involving
additional mixed messages where the probability of ultimate acquittal, and the loss to the jurors,
are both strictly increasing in the length of the speech.
In the context of elections, this result suggests that a candidate who needs support from only one
of two groups of voters can always beneﬁt from being informative about intended policies, while a
candidate with a smaller base who needs bipartisan support from both groups is better oﬀ babbling.
Generally, persuasive cheap talk must have a divisive eﬀect in equilibrium by attracting one group of
voters at the expense of alienating the other, so voting rules aﬀect communication via the incentive
they generate to be divisive or not. This result adds to the long literature following Condorcet on
how voting rules aﬀect the aggregation of information among voters (e.g., Timothy Feddersen and
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998; Cesar Martinelli, 2002). Peter Coughlan (2000) and David Austen-
Smith and Timothy Feddersen (2006) extend this literature to consider cheap talk between voters
before voting, and show that the unanimity rule for jury convictions discourages information ﬂows
among informed jurors with diﬀerent preferences. Our results show that an outside expert can beneﬁt
from cheap talk to voters, and such communication can make all voters worse oﬀ in expectation.
3.3 Disclosure in Auctions
Now consider when a seller with information about multiple attributes of a single product can beneﬁt
from cheap talk that favors one attribute over another. We analyze this question in the context of a
private value auction in which buyers care diﬀerently about diﬀerent product attributes. Information
about the product’s true strengths increases the allocational eﬃciency of the auction by making it
more likely that buyers who value those strengths win the auction. But such information also softens
competition by increasing the spread in buyer valuations between those buyers and the buyers who
value other attributes.
T os e ew h e t h e rt h e r ei san e tb e n e ﬁt to the seller from cheap talk, suppose a seller with infor-
mation on N =2attributes of an object engages in cheap talk with n ≥ 2 potential buyers prior
to holding a second-price auction. Buyers have correlated values, vj = λjθ1 +(1−λj)θ2,w h e r et h e
seller privately knows θ ∈ [0,1]2,e a c hb i d d e rj privately knows λj ∈ [0,1],w h e r eλj is independent
of θ and of λi, i 6= j.20 For instance, we may think of θ1 (θ2) as the short-run (long-run) value of a
product with λj capturing the time preference of buyer j =1 ,...,n. Each buyer’s dominant strategy
is to bid his expected value E[vj|m]=λja1 +(1−λj)a2 given the seller’s message m and associated
estimates a = E[θ|m]. Therefore the seller’s expected revenue is the expected second-highest bid,
U(a)=E[2nd max
λj
{λja1 +( 1− λj)a2}].( 4 )
20This formulation of buyer valuations ensures that the identity of the winning bidder varies with (buyer estimates)
of the seller’s information θ. As long as this is guaranteed, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. See Simon
Board (2009) for similar conditions for the case where the seller can commit to a disclosure policy.
11Since U is continuous in a, by Theorem 1 the seller can credibly disclose information through cheap
talk for all n and any priors on θ and λ.
The following Proposition shows that (4) reduces to a concave min{·} function for n =2since
the second highest of two bids is the minimum bid. It is linear for n =3and reduces to a convex
max{·} function for n>3. Since concavity (convexity) implies quasiconcavity (quasiconvexity),
the seller beneﬁts from communication if and only if there are four or more bidders, where a strict
beneﬁt is ensured by selection of the point c. The proposition also conﬁrms that buyers are always
at least weakly better oﬀ from the gain in allocational eﬃciency, and that they are strictly better
oﬀ if there are four or more bidders.
Proposition 3 Seller cheap talk strictly increases seller revenues if and only if n ≥ 4.E x p e c t e d
buyer rents and total surplus are weakly higher regardless of n and strictly so if n ≥ 4.
As an example consider the symmetric case where both the θi and the λj are i.i.d. uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. If there is no communication then a1 = a2 =1 /2 so every bidder has the
same expected value and seller revenues are 1/2 for any n. If the seller discloses whether or not
θ1 ≥ θ2,t h e na1 =2 /3 and a2 =1 /3 or vice versa. In the former case the expected price is the bid
of the buyer with the second highest value of λj, and in the latter case it is the bid of the buyer
with the second lowest value of λj. Following standard order statistic calculations, E[λj:n]=
j
n+1,









n+1 which is increasing in
n, approaches 2/3 in the limit of perfect competition between buyers, and exceeds 1/2 for n ≥ 4.
Figure 2(c) shows the seller’s quasiconvex preferences when n =5 .
If instead of a second price auction we had a ﬁrst price auction, then by the revenue equivalence
theorem, for each value of the estimates a the expected revenue of the seller would still be given by
the expression for U(a) derived above. It follows that the set of informative cheap talk equilibria
and their revenue implications are identical across all auction formats for which standard revenue
equivalence results obtain.21
This result adds to the existing literature on auction disclosure which assumes commitment to
revealing truthful, veriﬁable information. This literature shows that with a large enough number of
bidders, the seller gains from disclosure on average (Juan-José Ganuza, 2004; Simon Board, 2009),22
but disclosure may increase or decrease revenues depending on the seller’s exact information. With
multidimensional information the seller can credibly communicate through unveriﬁable cheap talk
and, with suﬃciently many bidders, the seller beneﬁts for any realization of her information so there
is no need for commitment.
3.4 Advertising as Cheap Talk
Due to the conﬂict of interest between an advertiser and buyers, the advertising literature has not
examined whether the content of an advertisement can be credible even when it cannot be veriﬁed.
21We assume there are no reserve prices which is optimal when the seller’s reservation value is lower than the lowest
possible virtual valuation of the buyers (e.g., Roger Myerson, 1981).
22T h ee xa n t eg a i n si na l l o c a t i o ne ﬃciency due to seller communication are also addressed by Juan-José Ganuza
and José Penalva (2006) and Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer (2007). Archishman Chakraborty, Nandini
Gupta, and Rick Harbaugh (2006) consider the gains from credible seller communication about multiple goods based
on the linkage principle (Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber, 1982). Colin Campbell (1998) and Antonio Miralles (2008)
consider the gains to buyers from credible communication among them about which goods to bid on.
12As an example of how information about multiple attributes of a product allows for cheap talk to
have a role in advertising, we consider a model where consumers are unsure of the nature of a good
supplied by a monopolist both along the vertical and the horizontal dimension.
Suppose that a monopolist ﬁrm, located at 0 faces a unit mass of consumers distributed uniformly
on [0,1]. A consumer located at x values the product of the ﬁrm at v − tx less the price p where v
captures a vertical aspect that is independent of consumer characteristics and t captures a horizontal
aspect that measures whether the product is a niche product or has more mass appeal. For instance,
v could represent the quality of a camera and t could represent its diﬃculty of use, or v could
represent the expected return on an asset and t could represent its riskiness. We suppose that both
v and t are the ﬁrm’s private information, marginal costs are zero, and as detailed in the proof of
Proposition 4, the parameters are such that some but not all consumers buy the product.
Prior to setting its price the ﬁrm can engage in cheap talk advertising about v and t.C o n s i s t e n t
with the cheap talk assumption, any costs of advertising do not vary with the ﬁrm’s private infor-
mation or the content m.L e t a1 = E[t|m] and a2 = E[v|m] be the estimates commonly held by
consumers given a message m from the entrant. The ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁts (excluding any ﬁxed






Since U(a) is continuous, by Theorem 1 there exists an inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium. Further-
more, U(a) is also strictly quasiconvex so that by Theorem 2 cheap talk strictly raises the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts with probability one. The following Proposition shows generally that the payoﬀso ft h eﬁrm
and each type of consumer are convex so everyone is better oﬀ in ex-ante expected terms from a
better understanding of the monopolist’s product.23
Proposition 4 Cheap talk advertising by a monopolist is Pareto improving.
As seen in the two-message equilibrium of Figure 2(d) for the case where t (= θ1)a n dv (= θ2)a r e
independently and uniformly distributed, the ﬁrm can credibly emphasize either quality or breadth
of appeal.24 Emphasizing the product’s quality allows for a higher price to a smaller set of buyers,
while emphasizing its mass appeal allows for more sales but at a lower price. In the ﬁrst case the
demand curve becomes higher and steeper, while in the second case it becomes lower and ﬂatter, and
in either case the ﬁrm beneﬁts relative to not communicating at all. Justin Johnson and David Myatt
(2006) show general conditions under which such rotations in the demand curve increase a ﬁrm’s
proﬁts - this example shows that such rotations can be induced by advertising that is pure cheap talk.
Unlike in a signaling model of advertising (e.g., Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 1986), the costs
and beneﬁts of advertising are not state-dependent so consumers do not learn about the product
from the expense of advertising, but rather learn from the content of advertising. And unlike in a
disclosure/persuasion game model of advertising (e.g., Simon Anderson and Régis Renault, 2006)
there is no restriction that the content must be veriﬁable.
23Advertising costs are given so the comparison is between advertising with and without content on product at-
tributes.
24The restriction that not all consumers is consumed is satisﬁed for a1 ≥ a2/2, so the extreme upper left region
does not satisfy this restriction.
134 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section we compare our approach to multidimensional cheap talk with the literature, and
indicate some of the remaining issues to be resolved. In a model with two competing experts,
Battaglini (2002) shows how multidimensional information permits communication in settings where
credible communication would not always be possible in one dimension. Using a multidimensional
extension of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of communication, he ﬁnds that in equilibrium
each expert can reveal information orthogonal to her own interests, and that the decision maker can
thereby infer the exact state of the world from both sources of information. However, it is only the
presence of the other expert that allows each expert to credibly reveal information, so this approach
does not work for a single expert.
Archishman Chakraborty and Rick Harbaugh (2007) analyze communication in which a single
expert discloses complete or partial rankings of multiple variables, e.g., a stock analyst provides
a ranking of diﬀerent stocks or a categorization of stocks into “buy”, “hold” and “sell” group-
ings. They ﬁnd that a complementarity condition on preferences is suﬃcient for such “comparative
cheap talk” to be inﬂuential when preferences and priors are suﬃciently symmetric across dimen-
sions.25CHANGED As shown by Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin (2007), the assumption of suﬃcient
symmetry can be necessary in that communication can sometimes break down when preferences or
priors are suﬃciently asymmetric.
The present paper combines insights from these approaches to show how, even with arbitrary
asymmetries, a single expert can reveal detailed comparative information along all but one dimension.
The key assumption that diﬀers from the literature is that the expert’s preferences over the decision
maker’s estimates are state-independent and common knowledge. In contrast, in the Crawford and
Sobel model the expert prefers to induce an estimate that diﬀers from the true state of the world
by the expert’s bias. Therefore, even when this bias is common knowledge, the expert’s preferences
over the decision maker’s estimates are state-dependent.
State-dependence is necessary in a one-dimensional model to introduce non-trivial commonality
of interest between the expert and decision maker, e.g., the expert has a bias toward the decision
maker having a higher estimate but this bias is limited so the expert does not want to exaggerate
too much.26 With multidimensional information, even if the expert has a strict preference ordering
over the decision maker’s estimates in each dimension, e.g., always prefers a higher estimate, the
expert will not have a strict ordering over all estimate vectors if preferences are continuous. There-
fore the absence of conﬂict along some dimensions — and the potential for cheap talk along those
dimensions when they are common knowledge — is inherent to multidimensional environments. By
assuming state-independence, we are able to focus purely on this property of multiple dimensions of
information.
Our model applies best to situations where the expert has a strong incentive to exaggerate,
25The complementarity condition is satisﬁed weakly in this paper due to the state-independence assumption. In
two dimensions the equilibria in Theorem 1 of this paper are a generalization of the comparative cheap talk equilibria
they examine. Campbell (1998) provides an early application of comparative cheap talk in auctions.
26If Θ were one-dimensional in an environment with state-independent preferences, the hyperplane h corresponding
to the construction in Theorem 1 would just be a point dividing the interval into regions corresponding to a “good”
or “bad” message. An inﬂuential equilibrium exists in this case if and only if the expert switches which of the two
estimates associated with each region is preferred as h varies over the interval. Such a switching condition cannot be
satisﬁed, for example, by monotonic preferences.
14implying both that the potential for communication in a single dimension is limited and that the in-
tricacies of state-dependence can be abstracted away from. In fact, the assumption of an arbitrarily
large bias toward a higher estimate is standard in the literatures on signaling (Spence, 1973), screen-
ing (Stiglitz, 1975), and persuasion/disclosure (Milgrom, 1981; Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew
Postlewaite, and Kotaro Suzumura, 1990; Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein, 2004). Therefore our
focus on such preferences shows that cheap talk can be applied to the wide range of environments
which previously have been analyzed using only these other models of communication.
This idea that a strong incentive to exaggerate in each dimension can be captured by a sim-
ple model of state-independent preferences is formalized in Proposition 7 in the online Appendix.
We show that standard state-dependent Euclidean preferences converge uniformly to transparent
linear preferences as the biases in each dimension increase in a ﬁxed ratio. Moreover, the expert’s
biases across dimensions (the expert’s “slant”) converges to that of the ratios of the biases within
dimensions. This provides a close link between the idea of an expert being biased towards a higher
action as developed in the Crawford and Sobel model, and the idea of an expert being biased across
dimensions as emphasized in this paper.
Recent research has considered how uncertainty over the expert’s bias in a single dimension in
the Crawford and Sobel model aﬀects communication.27 In our context the corresponding question
is how communication is aﬀected by uncertainty over the expert’s bias across dimensions. Our as-
sumption of state-independence implies that any such biases are transparent to the decision maker,
but in the online Appendix we analyze two situations where our approach can be used to show that
communication remains possible despite limited uncertainty. Proposition 5 shows that communica-
tion is still possible when there are more dimensions of information than types of experts, e.g., a
salesperson might be biased or not toward the products of one of two companies and there are at
least three products the salesperson is informed about. And Proposition 6 shows that communica-
tion is still possible when the expert is likely to be biased in one direction but there is a small chance
that she is biased in another direction. The general question of how uncertainty about the expert’s
biases aﬀects communication in multidimensional environments remains open.
AA p p e n d i x 28
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :We look for an inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium involving a single hy-
perplane hs,c of orientation s ∈ SN−1 passing through c ∈ int(Θ) that partitions Θ into two non-
empty sets R+(hs,c) and its complement R−(hs,c), with corresponding receiver actions a+(hs,c) and
a−(hs,c).L e tR+(hs,c) be in the halfspace that contains the point s+c.N o t i c eﬁrst that under the
assumed conditions on priors, a+(hs,c) ∈ int(R+(hs,c)) and a− ∈ int(R−(hs,c)), implying in partic-
ular that a+(hs,c) 6= a−(hs,c) so that any such equilibrium, if it exists, is inﬂuential. Furthermore,
a+(hs,c) and a−(hs,c) are continuous functions of s (with the subspace topology for SN−1) for any
27John Morgan and Phillip Stocken (2003) consider the Crawford and Sobel model when the expert might be biased
or unbiased and their results imply that such uncertainty can improve communication compared to the case where
the expert has a known but intermediate bias. Vassilios Dimitrakas and Yianis Saraﬁdis (2005) show that revelation
of the expert’s bias can hurt communication when the size of the possible bias is uncertain, and Ming Li and Kristof
Madarasz (2008) show that revelation always hurts communication when the direction of the bias is uncertain. An
uncertain expert bias is also analyzed by Joel Sobel (1985), Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque (1992), Sidartha
Gordon (2006), Stephen Morris (2001), Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani (2007), and Giuseppe Moscarini (2007).
28Additional Appendix available online.
15ﬁxed c ∈ int(Θ). Notice next that for any two antipodal orientations −s,s ∈ SN−1,w em u s th a v e
R+(hs,c)=R−(h−s,c) and so R−(hs,c)=R+(h−s,c). It follows that a+(hs,c)=a−(h−s,c) implying
in particular that the map ∆(·;c):SN−1 → R deﬁned by ∆(s,c)=U(a−(hs,c)) − U(a+(hs,c))
is a continuous odd function of s. By the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, there exists s∗ ∈ SN−1 such
that ∆(s∗,c)=0 . The hyperplane through c with orientation s∗ generates a two-message convex
partitional equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2: Recall that U is a (strictly) quasiconvex function iﬀ every lower contour
set W(x)={a|U(a) ≤ U(x)} is (strictly) convex, i.e., for all x0,x 00 ∈ W(x), x0 6= x00 and λ ∈ (0,1),
U(λx0 +( 1− λ)x00) <U (x). Similarly, U is (strictly) quasiconcave iﬀ every upper contour set
B(x)={a|U(a) ≥ U(x)} is (strictly) convex. Given prior F, we prove the slightly stronger result
that communication (strictly) beneﬁts the expert if W(E[θ]) is (strictly) convex and (strictly) hurts
if B(E[θ]) is (strictly) convex. Consider any k message equilibrium with induced actions a1,...,a k
such that the actions satisfy aj = E[θ|mk] where mk is a message that induces action ak.S i n c ea l l
the induced actions belong to the same level set of U in equilibrium, they must all belong either to
W(E[θ]) or to B(E[θ]).S u p p o s eW(E[θ]) is strictly convex, but contrary to the claim, the induced
actions a1,...,ak belong to W(E[θ]). By strict convexity of W(E[θ]), every convex combination of
the induced actions must then yield utility strictly less than E[θ]. But this is impossible since,
by the law of iterated expectations, E[θ] is itself a convex combination of the induced actions,
E[θ]=
Pk
j=1 pjaj where pj > 0 is the probability with which aj is induced. This proves the strict
version of the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ec l a i m . T h ea r g u m e n ta l s os h o w st h a ti fW(E[θ]) is convex but not
strictly so, communication may only weakly raise the expert’s payoﬀs. Symmetric remarks apply to
t h ec a s ew h e r eB(E[θ]) is (strictly) convex.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . The discussion in the text establishes the existence of 2k message
equilibrium from a 2k−1 message equilibrium, k ≥ 2, by choosing an interior point c for each
partition element, applying Theorem 1 to ﬁnd an equilibrium hyperplane, and then exploiting the
linearity of U and applying the law of iterated expectations. Note now that for any such 2k-message
equilibrium, all induced actions belong to the set A = {a|ρ · a = ρ · E[θ]}.W ew i s ht od e m o n s t r a t e
that for every ε>0,w ec a nﬁnd a 2k-message equilibrium such that there exists an induced action
a∗ ∈ A that is is within ε distance of a for every a ∈ A. In this sense, the set A is asymptotically
(in k) dense in the induced actions and we say that the expert reveals all information in the N − 1
dimensions corresponding to the N − 1 dimensional compact set A.
First consider the case where N =2and ﬁx ε>0. Consider the ball Bε(a),o p e ni nR2,o fr a d i u s
ε and centered around a ∈ A.N o t i c en e x tt h a tf o rk large enough, there exists an element P of the
equilibrium partition such that P∩A ⊂ Bε(a). This follows from the centerpoint theorem that each
element has probability mass at most (1−1/(N +1 ) ) k < mina∈A Pr{θ ∈ Bε(a)},f o rk large enough,
provided that in each stage of creating successively ﬁner partitions in the equilibrium construction
above we choose the interior point c through which the corresponding hyperplane h passes as the
centerpoint of the corresponding convex compact partition element. But then the equilibrium action
a∗ ∈ P∩A corresponding to the element P must lie within ε of a.
Next consider the case where N>2.W e c o n s t r u c t a 2k-message equilibrium with the desired
property as follows. Introduce N−2 ﬁctitious linear preferences Uj1(a)=ρj1·a for j1 =1 ,...,N −2.
We use the index j1 =0to denote the actual expert preferences, i.e., ρ0 = ρ, and assume that all
ρj1 are linearly independent. Using the Borsuk-Ulam theorem and the law of iterated expectations,
16we can construct a 2k-element partition of Θ with the property that the resulting 2k action proﬁles
lie on a unique line A1 = {a|ρj1 ·a = ρj1 ·E[θ],j 1 =0 ,...,N −2} ⊂A. We can then choose a second
distinct set of N − 2 linearly independent ﬁctitious types and construct a 2k-element partition, for
each element i =1 ,...,2k of the 2k-element partition obtained in the previous step, treating that
element as the entire state-space, following the same procedure as above. The resulting 2k action
proﬁles lie on a unique line A2,i = {a|ρj2,i ·a = ρj2,i ·E[θ],j 2,i =0 ,...,N −2} ⊂A that can be chosen
to be orthogonal to A1 for each i =1 ,...,2k, for a total of 22k actions. Repeat this procedure N −1
times, at each step using a new set of N −2 distinct ﬁctitious preferences to obtain successively the
lines A1,{A2,i}2k
i=1,...,{AN−1,i}2(N−2)k
i=1 . Notice that the resultant actions and associated partition of
Θ is a 2(N−1)k-message equilibrium with each induced action on some line AN−1,i, i =1 ,...,2(N−2)k.
For suitable choices of c, by the centerpoint theorem it follows, as for the case N =2 , that for any
ε>0 and k large enough, it follows that for any a ∈ A, there must be an equilibrium action a∗
within ε of a.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 : We prove the result by induction on k ≥ 1. Suppose, as part of the
inductive hypothesis, that we have a 2k-message equilibrium associated with a 2k-element partition
of Θ created by 2k−1 hyperplanes, k ≥ 1. Identify the j-th partition element μj (a compact convex
subset of θ with non-empty interior) by the message mj and the corresponding induced action by
aj. We suppose that message mj is sent by all θ ∈ int{μj} with probability pj ∈ (0,1] that does
not depend on θ. Message mj m a ya l s ob es e n tb yo t h e rt y p e sθ/ ∈ μj with positive probability.
Let z
j
in = E[θ|mj,θ ∈ μj] and z
j
out = E[θ|mj,θ / ∈ μj], whenever deﬁned. By the law of iterated




out, so that the line joining the latter
two points must pass through aj. Since we have an equilibrium, U(a1)=... = U(a2k
). We proceed
by induction on k by ﬁrst creating a 2k+1-element partition of Θ from the given 2k-element partition.
Next, we adjust the induced actions via mixed strategies in order to obtain an equilibrium with 2k+1
messages.
For each mj, consider a hyperplane through z
j
in ∈ int(μj) of orientation s ∈ SN−1 that splits μj
into two regions μj+(s) and μj−(s) a n de x p e c t e dv a l u e sz
j+
in (s) and z
j−
in (s). Relative to the original
2k-element partition, we think of this new 2k+1-element partition where each corresponding message
mj is split into two messages mj+ and mj− such that (i) each θ ∈ μj sends message mj+ (resp.,
mj−) with the same probability pj > 0 as the original message mj if θ ∈ μj+ (resp., μj−)a n d
does not send the other message mj− (resp., mj+); and, (ii) each θ/ ∈ μj who sent mj with positive
probability, now splits that probability equally between the messages mj+ and mj−.A c c o r d i n g l y ,
the corresponding actions can be written as aj+(s)=E[θ|mj+]=πj+(s)z
j+





in (s)+( 1− πj−(s))z
j
out where the conditional probabilities are
πj+(s)=P r [ θ ∈ μj+(s)|mj+]=
pj Pr[θ ∈ μj+(s)]
pj Pr[θ ∈ μj+(s)] + 1
2 Pr[mj,θ / ∈ μj]
(6)
πj−(s)=P r [ θ ∈ μj−(s)|mj−]=
pj Pr[θ ∈ μj−(s)]
pj Pr[θ ∈ μj−(s)] + 1
2 Pr[mj,θ / ∈ μj]
. (7)





in (s), it follows that aj+(−s)=aj−(s) for all s, and symmetrically aj−(−s)=aj+(s).B u tt h e n
the diﬀerence U(aj+(s))−U(aj−(s)) is a continuous odd function of s, so that by the Borsuk-Ulam
theorem there exists sj∗ ∈ SN−1 such that U(aj+(sj∗)) − U(aj−(sj∗)) = 0,f o re a c hj =1 ,....,2k.
Furthermore, by the law of iterated expectations, there exists δ
j ∈ (0,1) such that aj = δ
jaj+(sj∗)+
17Figure 3: Mixed message construction
(1 − δ
j)aj−(sj∗
) for each j. Since the orientation sj∗ will be ﬁxed for all j for the remainder of the
proof we suppress it in what follows. The left panel of Figure 3 depicts the typical situation with
respect to the new actions and expectations obtained for the j-th element of the original 2k-element
partition and it will be useful for the reader to consult it for the rest of the proof.29
If U(aj+)=U(aj−) does not vary with j,w eh a v ec r e a t e da2k+1-message equilibrium. If not,
suppose without loss of generality that U(aj+)=U(aj−) is the lowest for j =1 .S i n c e f o r t h e
original 2k-message equilibrium U(aj) did not depend on j, exploiting the strict quasiconvexity of
U we have for all j>1,
U(aj+)=U(aj−) ≥ U(a1+)=U(a1−) >U(a1)=U(aj). (8)
For each j for which the ﬁrst inequality in (8) holds with equality we do not alter the probabilities
with which the messages mj+ and mj− are sent. In contrast, for j for which the ﬁrst inequality
in (8) is strict, we adjust the induced actions after messages mj+ and mj− respectively by suitably
altering the probabilities by which these messages are sent, as follows.
First, since preferences are continuous, from (8) there must exist qj,r j ∈ (0,1) and actions
a(qj)=qjaj+ +( 1− qj)aj and a(rj)=rjaj+ +( 1− rj)aj− such that U(a(qj)) = U(a(rj)) =
U(a1+)=U(a1−). Indeed, we must have 1 >q j >δ
j >r j > 0, i.e., a(qj) and a(rj) both lie on the
line joining aj+ and aj− that passes through aj,o ne i t h e rs i d eo faj.T h i si sd e p i c t e di nt h er i g h t
panel of Figure 3. We wish to adjust the induced actions to a(qj) and a(rj), after messages mj+
and mj− respectively, by suitably altering the probabilities by which these messages are sent.
Let αj+pj (resp., αj−pj) be the probability with which any θ ∈ μj+ (resp., μj−) sends message
mj+ (resp., mj−), with the remaining probability (1 − αj+)pj (resp., (1 − αj−
)pj) on the other
message mj− (resp., mj+), αj+,α j− ∈ (0,1). Similarly, let θ/ ∈ μj, divide the probability with which
they sent the original message mj into the messages mj+ and mj− in the ratio γ/(1−γ), γ ∈ (0,1).
We wish to ﬁnd αj+,α j− and γ such that a(qj)=E[θ|mj+] and a(rj)=E[θ|mj−].T o t h i s e n d ,
produce the line joining z
j




in (that must pass
through z
j
in)t oo b t a i nt h ep o i n tzj+(α) as depicted in the right panel of Figure 3; similarly, obtain









out and aj. The arguments go through in the co-linear case, except for non-generic situations where,
in addition, aj+ = aj− = aj.F o r N>2, this can be ruled out generally by choosing sj∗ to guarantee also that
πj+(sj∗)=πj−(sj∗).
18zj−(α). Using Bayes’ Rule, it is not diﬃcult to verify that there exist αj+,α j− ∈ (0,1) such that
E[θ|mj+,θ ∈ μj]=zj+(α) and E[θ|mj−,θ ∈ μj]=zj−(α), implying that there exists γ ∈ (0,1)
such that
a(qj)=E[θ|mj+]=P r [ θ ∈ μj|mj+]zj+(α)+P r [ θ/ ∈ μj|mj+]z
j
out (9)
a(rj)=E[θ|mj−]=P r [ θ ∈ μj|mj−]zj−(α)+P r [ θ/ ∈ μj|mj−]z
j
out (10)
and we suppress the details.
This completes the construction of the communication strategies and induced actions that con-
stitute a 2k+1-message equilibrium from a 2k message equilibrium. Since, by Theorem 1 such an
equilibrium exists for the case k =1 , this completes the induction. By the strict quasiconvexity of
U,p a y o ﬀs are strictly increasing in k.
Proof of Proposition 2: U is strictly quasiconvex if G1(a1)G2(a2) is strictly quasiconcave.
Since a suﬃcient condition for strict quasiconcavity is strict logconcavity, U is strictly quasiconvex if
lnG1(a1)+lnG2(a2) is strictly concave. But if each Gi(ai) is strictly logconcave, the last expression
is the sum of strictly concave functions and so strictly concave.
Regarding payoﬀs to the jurors, in any equilibrium and given a message m, the expected payoﬀ
to juror i =1 ,2 unconditional on τi is equal to the probability of conviction times the expected
payoﬀ given conviction and m,
G1(E[θ1|m])G2(E[θ2|m])(E[θi|m] − E[τi|τi <E [θi|m]]). (11)
Notice ﬁrst that the equilibrium probability of conviction G1(E[θ1|m])G2(E[θ2|m]) does not depend
on m. Furthermore, this probability is strictly lower in an inﬂuential equilibrium compared to the
babbling equilibrium. Letting h(x) ≡ x−E[τi|τi <x ], notice also from (11) that the expected payoﬀ
to a juror given conviction and m is equal to h(E[θi|m]) in an inﬂuential equilibrium and equal to
h(E[θi]) in the babbling equilibrium. To show that jurors may be strictly worse oﬀ in expectation
(over m)i na ni n ﬂuential equilibrium, it suﬃces then to show that the function h is weakly concave
in x and apply Jensen’s inequality. This is equivalent to E[τi|τi <x ] being weakly convex in x
which holds for many logconcave distributions, including the uniform.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :From (4) we can write
U(a)=
(
E[λ2:n]a1 +( 1− E[λ2:n])a2 if a1 ≤ a2
E[λn−1:n]a1 +( 1− E[λn−1:n])a2 if a1 >a 2
(12)
where λj:n is the jth lowest buyer signal, j =1 ,...,n. Notice from (12) that the (expected) price
equals either the (expected) bid of the buyer with the second-lowest private signal λ2:n or that
of the buyer with the second-highest one λn−1:n.F o r n =2 , λ2:n >λ n−1:n almost surely so (4)
is U =m i n {E[λ2:n]a1 +( 1− E[λ2:n])a2,E[λn−1:n]a1 +( 1− E[λn−1:n])a2}, a concave and hence
quasiconcave function of a, implying from Theorem 2 inﬂuential cheap talk cannot raise expected
revenue when n =2 . Similarly, when n =3 , λ2:n = λn−1:n and U is linear in a,s of r o mT h e o r e m2a l l
cheap talk equilibria must yield the same expected revenue. However, for n ≥ 4, λ2:n <λ n−1:n almost
surely and so (4) reduces to U =m a x {E[λ2:n]a1+(1−E[λ2:n])a2,E[λn−1:n]a1+(1−E[λn−1:n])a2},a
convex and hence quasiconvex function of a, implying from Theorem 2 inﬂuential cheap talk cannot
lower expected revenue when n ≥ 4. To ensure a strict gain, we choose the reference point c to be
19at the kink of the seller’s indiﬀerence curve through E[θ] so that the induced actions lie on diﬀerent
linear segments of the same higher indiﬀerence curve.
Notice next that the expected total surplus (sum of buyer rents and seller revenue) equals the
expected value of the winning bidder which in turn equals
max{E[λ1:n]a1 +( 1− E[λ1:n])a2,E[λn:n]a1 +( 1− E[λn:n])a2} (13)
for all n ≥ 2. Since this is a convex function of a, total surplus must weakly rise from inﬂuential
communication regardless of n. Since seller revenues are weakly lower from communication when
n<4, it follows that buyer rents must weakly rise for such n.
It remains to show that both buyer rents and total surplus must strictly rise when n ≥ 4.
Assume wlog that E[θ2] ≥ E[θ1] so that under babbling the sum of buyers’ expected payoﬀsi s
E[λn:n − λn−1:n]E[θ2 − θ1]. Because U has piecewise linear indiﬀerence curves with a kink on the
diagonal, it suﬃces to consider the two-message cheap talk equilibrium with c chosen as above
to ensure diﬀerent winning and second highest bidders across messages. Let P+ and P− are the
equilibrium probabilities of messages m+ and m− respectively, and suppose wlog that m+ boosts
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1 ] by the law of iterated expectations.
This reduces to E[λn:n−λn−1:n] >E [λ1:n−λ2:n] which always holds. Since seller revenues also rise,
total surplus is also strictly higher.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :First suppose v and t are common knowledge. Then given a price p
the cutoﬀ consumer x (supposing one exists) who is indiﬀerent between purchasing the product or
not satisﬁes v−tx−p =0 , where the value of non-consumption is zero. This yields D = x =( v−p)/t
as the demand function faced by the monopolist. The proﬁt maximizing price is p∗ = v
2, yielding
quantity x∗ = v
2t,p r o ﬁt Π∗ = v2
4t, and equilibrium consumer surplus for consumer x ∈ [0,1] of
S∗
x =m a x [ v − tx − p∗,0].A s s u m i n gt h a tt ≥ v/2 ensures that not all consumers consume.
In the present setting, t and v are known only by the ﬁrm, but since consumer utility is linear in t
and v, and since these variables only aﬀect ﬁrm payoﬀs via consumer decisions, the above expressions







Since this is continuous and strictly quasiconvex in a, it follows via Theorems 1 and 2 that the
entrant ﬁrm’s proﬁts are strictly higher because of cheap talk. Since S∗
x is also convex in a,e a c h
consumer x is weakly better oﬀ, with those who switch from not buying the product to buying it
(or vice versa) as a function of the entrant’s message strictly so.
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24B Online Appendix
Our results in the main text concern the case where the expert’s preferences U(a) over the decision
maker’s actions are common knowledge and so independent of the state θ. But often the decision
maker might believe that he has a good sense of the expert’s preferences, and yet still face some
uncertainty over the exact preferences. In this online Appendix we extend our results to allow
the decision maker to face some limited uncertainty about the expert’s preferences, including the
possibility that preferences are correlated with the state θ.
DROPPED Suppose that the expert’s preferences are given by a function U(a,t), continuous in
a,w h e r et ∈ T is the type of the expert. The expert knows her own type t (in addition to θ), but
the decision maker only has a prior Φ on t.L e tF(θ|t) summarize the conditional distribution of θ
given t ∈ T. This approach allows t to be independent of θ or to be correlated with θ.I ta l s oc o v e r s
the Crawford-Sobel model where t = θ. More importantly, it allows us to conceptually separate
uncertainty about the expert’s motives t from that about the decision maker’s ideal course of action
θ. Notice that the expert’s type t is fully speciﬁed by the pair U(.,t) and F(.|t).
We analyze three extensions in this Appendix which show the robustness of our main results.
The ﬁrst extension allows for arbitrary Φ but supposes that T is small. This captures situations
where the decision maker attaches positive probability to only a few possible expert types. We ﬁnd
that if there are only a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent types of expert preferences, then an informative
equilibrium exists as long as there are a larger number of dimensions of interest to the decision
maker(s).
The second concerns the case where the prior Φ is concentrated on a particular type t∗ ∈ T =
{1,...,T}. This captures situations where the decision maker is almost certain that the expert has
preferences U(a,t∗), although there are potentially many other unlikely possibilities. We ﬁnd that
when the expert’s preferences are suﬃciently likely to be from one type, then under mild regularity
conditions an equilibrium exists in which the decision maker listens to the expert and adjusts his
use of the expert’s information to reﬂect the fact that low probability types always recommend the
same action.
The third extension relaxes the equilibrium notion from cheap talk to epsilon cheap talk and
focuses on the case where the expert’s type space is rich, i.e., t = θ, but her type has a limited
eﬀect on (diﬀerences in) her utility. In particular we consider Euclidean preferences which are
state-dependent but that converge uniformly to state-independent preferences as the bias in each
dimension increases. We show that any incentive to deviate from the cheap talk equilibria of the
limiting preferences goes to zero.
B.1 More Issues Than Motives
We ﬁrst consider the case where there is a larger number of issues N relative to the number of
types T. For instance, suppose a car magazine is biased toward one of several car manufacturers
and the reader is unsure of which manufacturer is favored, so that there are several types of expert
preferences T. If the magazine has information on multiple models for some manufacturers and/or
on multiple attributes of some models, then the dimensionality of information N is larger than T and
it would seem that comparative statements about diﬀerent models or about the relative strengths
of particular models should be credible. Application of the Borsuk-Ulam theorem conﬁrms this
1intuition quite generally.
Proposition 5 Suppose N>T .T h e na ni n ﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium exists for all T and Φ.
Proof: The arguments are identical to that for Theorem 1. The only diﬀerence is that now
we look for an s that simultaneously sets the T ≤ N − 1 maps ∆(s,c,t)=U(a−(hs,c),t) −
U(a+(hs,c),t)=0 ,o n ef o re a c ht ∈ T. ¥
When N>T ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd a two-message partition of Θ that is an equilibrium for
every type t ∈ T. In other words, it is possible to ﬁnd an informative communication strategy
that induces actions in RN that the T possible types of the expert agree on. This is not surprising
for linear U(.,t) since satisfying all the T experts simultaneously still leaves N − 1 − T degrees of
freedom. Proposition 5 shows that it suﬃces simply to count equations and unknowns in general for
all continuous preferences. Hence even in an environment where an expert’s motives are unclear, an
expert can often gain credibility via knowledge of a large number of decision-relevant issues. In the
next section we consider the case where N is instead small relative to T but only one type is very
likely.
B.2 Almost Certain Motives
Now suppose that the prior Φ =( φ1,...,φT) is close to the degenerate distribution Φ∗ on type t∗ ∈ T
(i.e., φ
∗
t∗ =1 ). We use the implicit function theorem to look for equilibria in the neighborhood of the
equilibria identiﬁed by Theorem 1 for the degenerate case, for general preferences and conditional
distributions of θ. In such equilibria the decision maker anticipates that the low probability types
will not be indiﬀerent so they will always oﬀer the same advice. For instance, the decision maker
thinks that the expert is probably unbiased across dimensions, U = a1+a2, but there is some chance
that the expert has a relatively extreme slant, U =4 a1 + a2, in which case she will oﬀer the same
advice regardless of the state θ.
To apply the implicit function theorem we assume that U(a,t) is continuously diﬀerentiable in
a for each t ∈ T and, for simplicity, consider only the case N =2 . We also suppose that the types
t ∈ T have diﬀerent preferences from each other in the following sense: for any two action proﬁles
a,a0 with a 6= a0,i fU(a,t∗)=U(a0,t ∗),t h e nU(a,t) 6= U(a0,t) for all t 6= t∗, t ∈ T.W ec a l lt h i s
condition (S). Notice that it will hold if, for instance, the indiﬀerence curves of the diﬀerent types
satisfy a single-crossing property in R2.30
Proposition 6 Suppose U satisﬁes (S) and N =2 . Generically in U(.,t∗), F(.|t∗),t h e r ee x i s t s
ε>0 such that for each Φ with ||Φ − Φ∗|| <εan inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium exists.
Proof: For any ﬁxed c ∈ int(Θ),l e ts∗ be the orientation of an equilibrium hyperplane through
c with corresponding actions a+(hs∗,c) and a−(hs∗,c) when priors are degenerate on t∗, i.e., given by
Φ∗.S u c hs∗ e x i s t sb yT h e o r e m1a n dw eh a v eU(a+(hs∗,c),t ∗)=U(a−(hs∗,c),t ∗). By condition (S),
for all t 6= t∗, U(a+,t) 6= U(a−,t). Wlog, rename types so that U(a+,t) >U(a−,t) for all t>t ∗ and
U(a+,t) <U (a−,t) for all t<t ∗ and consider the actual priors Φ. Pick a hyperplane of arbitrary
30Proposition 5 provides insight on how the following result can be extended to the case where N>2.I n b r i e f ,
one applies the implicit function theorem to the equilibrium of Proposition 5 constructed with N −1 types (including
t∗) disclosing a partition and the remaining types sending only one message. Condition (S) then has to be suitably
amended.
2orientation s through c (the same c as above) and, using usual notation, let the actions or expected
values corresponding to each message be








T h a ti s ,w ea s s u m et y p et∗ discloses the partition of Θ associated with hs,c truthfully, while all types
t>t ∗ (resp., t<t ∗) send only message m+ (resp., m−). Thus,
Pr[t∗|m+]=
Pr[θ ∈ m+|t∗]φt∗











if t>t ∗ and is 0 otherwise, and similarly for the message m−.L e t
∆(s,Φ,t)=U(α+(hs,c;Φ),t) − U(α−(hs,c;Φ),t) (20)
which is a continuously diﬀerentiable function of s. We know that ∆(s∗,Φ∗,t ∗)=0 .W e w i s h t o
show via the implicit function theorem that there exists ε>0, such that for ||Φ − Φ∗|| <ε ,t h e r e
exists s(Φ) close to s∗ for which ∆(s(Φ);Φ,t ∗)=0 . This is enough to show the result, since when
s(φ) is close to s∗ the corresponding actions α+(s(Φ);φ) and α−(s(φ);φ) are close to a+ and a−
respectively, so that ∆(s∗,Φ∗,t) < 0 if t<t ∗ and ∆(s∗,Φ∗,t) > 0 if t>t ∗.T h e nt y p et∗ has the
right incentives to disclose the partition of Θ associated with hs(Φ),c truthfully, while all types t>t ∗
(resp., t<t ∗) send only message m+ (resp., m−).














We then consider the function ∆(s(z),Φ,t ∗) as a function of z in a neighborhood of s∗. To apply
the implicit function theorem we have to show that ∂∆(s(z),Φ∗,t ∗)/∂z 6=0 . It is easy to see that
this derivative consists of terms involving the derivative of U(.,t∗) with respect to the actions (that
do not depend on F(.|t∗)) and terms involving the expected actions α+ and α− (that depend on
F(.|t∗) but not on U(.,t∗)) .S i n c ew ec a nv a r yF(.|t∗) and U(.,t∗) independently,
∂∆(s(z),Φ∗,t∗)
∂z can
vanish only in non-generic cases, establishing the result. ¥
In the inﬂuential equilibrium of Proposition 6, type t∗ discloses a two-message partition of Θ
similar to the equilibria of Theorem 1. By condition (S), no other type can be indiﬀerent between
two induced actions and so will send one of the two messages with probability one. Since Φ is close
to Φ∗, the induced actions (and the equilibrium partition) are close to the equilibrium of the case
where the expert’s likely type t∗ is common knowledge. The decision maker essentially ignores the
implications of messages from unlikely types t 6= t∗ in determining his action.31
31Since unlikely types always inﬂuence the decision maker in their preferred direction, this provides a multidimen-
sional perspective on the ﬁnding by Stefano DellaVigna and Ethan Kaplan (2007) that, in an environment where few
viewers expected a news network to have a conservative bias, Fox News had a large inﬂuence on voting behavior by
viewers.
3B.3 Epsilon Cheap Talk
For our third robustness test we consider preferences that are highly state-dependent, but that
converge to state-independent preferences. As a notable example of such preferences, we consider
Euclidean preferences where the expert’s utility is based on the distance between the expert’s ideal





(ai − (θi + bi))2
!1/2
(21)
where d(·,·) is the Euclidean distance function and b =( b1,...,bN) ∈ RN is the vector of known
biases representing the distance between the decision maker’s ideal action θ, and the expert’s ideal
action θ + b. Distance preferences are used in the leading example from Crawford and Sobel and in
a wide variety of applications.
As the expert’s bias in each dimension increases, Euclidean preferences converge uniformly to
state-independent linear preferences with known biases across dimensions equal to the ratios of these
biases within dimensions. More precisely, if we write b = ρB for some vector ρ ∈ RN, ρ 6=0 ,a n dr e a l
number B ≥ 0, then for any θ,a sB increases without bound the expert’s ideal point θ +b becomes
more and more distant from θ, and the circular indiﬀerence curves for Euclidean preferences become
straighter, and converge to those of known linear preferences of the form ρ · a given by (1).32
To use this convergence, we modify the game so that the expert’s payoﬀ from any action a and
message m given θ is U(a,m;θ)=−d(a,θ + b) less an arbitrarily small cost ε>0 of lying if the
message m is not consistent with θ.33 We study if inﬂuential equilibria exist in the modiﬁed game
with distance preferences (21) and an arbitrarily small cost of lying. We say that a communication
strategy is an ε-cheap talk equilibrium for large biases of the game with distance preferences if and
only if for each ε>0 there exists B such that for all B>B and any θ, the incentive to lie for an
expert is at most ε. Our next result shows an equivalence between such equilibria and the cheap
talk equilibria for linear preferences characterized by Theorem 3.34, 35
Proposition 7 Suppose U is Euclidean. Then for all F and all k, a communication strategy is a
k-message ε—cheap talk equilibrium for large biases if and only if it is a cheap talk equilibrium for
the limiting linear U with slant ρ.
32All arguments go through unchanged if each bi is of the form bi = κi + ρiB,f o rc o n s t a n t sκi.I ns u c hc a s e s ,a s
B becomes large the expert becomes inﬁnitely biased in dimensions where ρi 6=0but has ﬁnite (possibly, no) bias in
dimensions where ρi =0 .
33Since the meaning of a message is derived from a (candidate) equilibrium communication strategy, the notion of
what constitutes a “lie” is endogenous here. Therefore this equilibrium notion is distinct from that of an “almost
cheap talk” equilibrium (Kartik, 2008) or a “costly talk” equilibrium (Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintanni, 2007) in
which the sender’s reports have an exogenous meaning corresponding to the true value of the state and any deviation
from this true value is costly. Our notion corresponds to that of an ε-equilibrium of a cheap talk game.
34In an extension of their analysis of lexicographic preferences, Levy and Razin (2007) show for Euclidean preferences
that even slight asymmetries in distributions can preclude pure cheap talk for suﬃciently large but ﬁnite B.O u r
result shows that for suﬃciently large B any incentive to deceive the decision maker is arbitrarily close to 0.
35Epsilon equilibria are not invariant to monotonic transformations of the underlying preferences. For instance,
with a quadratic variant of the Euclidean speciﬁcation which drops the square root term in (21), the diﬀerence in
the sender’s utilities from actions a and a0 is unbounded in B, implying that our equivalence result obtains only if
the cost of lying also increases in the unit of payoﬀs B, e.g., if it is equal to εB for any ε>0. Note however that
indiﬀerence curves corresponding to such quadratic preferences are also linear at the limit of inﬁnite biases.
4Proof: We show that for all F and all k, a communication strategy is a k-message ε—cheap talk
equilibrium for Euclidean U with large B if and only if it is a cheap talk equilibrium for the limiting
linear preferences ρ · a.T od o t h i sﬁrst pick an arbitrary hyperplane hs,c of orientation s ∈ SN−1
passing through c ∈ int(Θ) and let L be the line joining the corresponding actions a+ = a+(hs,c)
and a− = a−(hs,c).P i c ka n yθ ∈ Θ and let p(θ) be the point where the perpendicular from θ + Bρ
on to L meets L.T h e n
p(θ)=q(θ)a+ +( 1− q(θ))a− (22)
where q(θ) ∈ R is given by
q(θ)=
(θ − a−) · (a+ − a−)+Bρ· (a+ − a−)
(a+ − a−) · (a+ − a−)
. (23)
Notice that this is well-deﬁned since a+ 6= a−.N o t i c en e x tt h a t
d(a+,θ+ b) − d(a−,θ+ b)=







For the if part consider ﬁrst a two-message cheap talk equilibrium with induced actions a+ and
a− when U is given by (1), so that ρ · (a+ − a−)=0 .T h e nq(θ) and so p(θ) do not depend on B.
Furthermore, using (24),
¯ ¯U(a+;θ + b) − U(a−;θ + b)
¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯d(a+,θ+ b) − d(a−,θ+ b)
¯ ¯ (25)
=
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
d2(a+,p(θ)) − d2(a−,p(θ))
d(a+,θ+ b)+d(a−,θ+ b)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤ max
θ∈Θ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
d2(a+,p(θ)) − d2(a−,p(θ))
d(a+,θ+ Bρ)+d(a−,θ+ Bρ)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯.
Let θB be the solution to the last maximization problem. As B rises, θB stays bounded in the
compact set Θ,s ot h a tp(θB) stays bounded as well, implying that the numerator stays bounded.
However the denominator becomes arbitrarily large. It follows that for any ε>0,f o rB large
enough, |U(a+,θ+ b) − U(a−,θ+ b)| <εfor all θ. An analogous argument obtains for the k-
message equilibria if we consider pairs of equilibrium actions that must all lie on the same line L
and use the logic above.
For the only if part, suppose that two actions a+ and a− do not constitute a two-message cheap
talk equilibrium when U is given by (1). Wlog, suppose that ρ · a+ <ρ· a−.C o n s i d e rt y p eθ = a+










d(a+,a + + Bρ)+d(a−,a + + Bρ)
¸
=




where we have used (22) and (23) in the last line. It follows that when ε<ρ· (a− − a+)/
√
ρ · ρ,
and B is large enough, type θ = a+ would gain by more than ε from lying (i.e., by inducing the
decision maker to choose the action a− instead of a+), implying in turn that h is not an ε-cheap talk
equilibrium for large B when U is given by (21). An identical argument obtains for the k-message
5equilibria of Theorem 3, k ≥ 2 and ﬁnite, if we consider some pair of actions for which ρ·a+ 6= ρ·a−.
¥
This convergence result implies that a strong incentive to exaggerate in each dimension can be
captured by our simple model of linear preferences. Moreover, since the expert’s biases or slant
across dimensions converges to that of the ratios of the biases within dimensions, the result formally
links the idea of an expert being biased towards a higher action as developed in the Crawford and
Sobel model, and the idea of an expert being biased across dimensions as emphasized in this paper.
6